16:29:53 #startmeeting fedora_coreos_meeting 16:29:53 Meeting started Wed Dec 8 16:29:53 2021 UTC. 16:29:53 This meeting is logged and archived in a public location. 16:29:53 The chair is dustymabe. Information about MeetBot at https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Zodbot#Meeting_Functions. 16:29:53 Useful Commands: #action #agreed #halp #info #idea #link #topic. 16:29:53 The meeting name has been set to 'fedora_coreos_meeting' 16:29:58 #topic roll call 16:30:00 .hi 16:30:01 dustymabe: dustymabe 'Dusty Mabe' 16:30:26 .hi 16:30:28 jdoss: jdoss 'Joe Doss' 16:30:37 .hi 16:30:38 ravanelli: ravanelli 'Renata Renata Andrade Matos Ravanelii' 16:30:40 well darn tootin - there's jdoss 16:30:41 .hello2 16:30:42 jaimelm: jaimelm 'Jaime Magiera' 16:30:50 Whats up dustymabe my good bud 16:31:02 oh you know.. just linux stuff 16:31:16 #chair jdoss ravanelli jaimelm 16:31:16 Current chairs: dustymabe jaimelm jdoss ravanelli 16:31:22 .hi 16:31:23 lucab: lucab 'Luca BRUNO' 16:31:27 .hello miabbott 16:31:28 miabbott: miabbott 'Micah Abbott' 16:31:48 dustymabe: yesterday evening I ended up on your blog again for your super sweet ipxe posts 16:31:57 .hello2 16:31:58 jlebon: jlebon 'None' 16:32:31 .hello siosm 16:32:32 travier[m]: siosm 'Timothée Ravier' 16:33:09 jdoss: ha - and there's so much content that never makes it to the blog either 16:33:11 :( 16:33:19 I feel that man 16:33:23 #chair lucab miabbott jlebon travier[m] 16:33:23 Current chairs: dustymabe jaimelm jdoss jlebon lucab miabbott ravanelli travier[m] 16:33:36 I can't even keep my work notes up to date. 16:34:10 #chair Saffronique 16:34:10 Current chairs: Saffronique dustymabe jaimelm jdoss jlebon lucab miabbott ravanelli travier[m] 16:34:13 .hi 16:34:14 .hello 16:34:14 lorbus: lorbus 'Christian Glombek' 16:34:17 saqali_: (hello ) -- Alias for "hellomynameis $1". 16:34:29 .hi 16:34:30 saqali_: Sorry, but user 'saqali_' does not exist 16:34:40 #chair lorbus 16:34:40 Current chairs: Saffronique dustymabe jaimelm jdoss jlebon lorbus lucab miabbott ravanelli travier[m] 16:35:04 .hello saqali 16:35:05 saqali_: saqali 'Saqib Ali' 16:35:34 #topic Action items from last meeting 16:35:43 Look at that 16:35:47 No action items from last meeting 🤷‍♂️ 16:36:03 🎉 16:36:11 too much Turkey 16:36:22 at least for us in the US 16:36:41 #chair saqali 16:36:41 Current chairs: Saffronique dustymabe jaimelm jdoss jlebon lorbus lucab miabbott ravanelli saqali travier[m] 16:36:43 🦃 16:37:19 miabbott: haha - I thought I had chaired him already but just realized my tab complete completed to Saffronique instead 16:37:41 #topic New Package Request: google-authenticator-libpam 16:37:47 #link https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/1037 16:38:21 travier[m]: and lucab have been chatting back and forth.. either one of you want to intro this one? 16:41:21 * dustymabe picks it up 16:41:50 looks like a request for google-authenticator-libpam to enable use of OTP for SSH login 16:42:21 #chair aaradhak 16:42:21 Current chairs: Saffronique aaradhak dustymabe jaimelm jdoss jlebon lorbus lucab miabbott ravanelli saqali travier[m] 16:42:40 I can take it 16:42:46 travier[m]: +1 16:42:56 .hi 16:42:57 jmarrero: jmarrero 'Joseph Marrero' 16:43:03 .hi 16:43:04 aaradhak: aaradhak 'Aashish Radhakrishnan' 16:43:14 #chair jmarrero 16:43:14 Current chairs: Saffronique aaradhak dustymabe jaimelm jdoss jlebon jmarrero lorbus lucab miabbott ravanelli saqali travier[m] 16:43:16 Summary: Add a PAM module to enable 2FA authentication over SSH 16:44:02 (I implicitly asked for the usecase and when I saw the answer I regretted asking :) 16:44:25 lucab: you're referring to the last comment (reply) in the ticket? 16:44:38 What makes it not really great for by-default inclusion: it needs setup (a shared secret between the host and client) and this is a per-node secret 16:45:09 hi, sorru 16:45:11 Nothing prevents this from being first-boot overlayed afaik 16:45:16 sorry for being late 16:45:29 There will be a penalty 16:46:16 could someone generate a secret once and share it with their fleet (i.e. same OTP for many nodes)? 16:46:33 jaimelm: explain? 16:46:48 I was joking about someone being late, not the topic. 16:47:15 I'm still reading the ticket 16:47:20 travier[m]: to be fair, they replied they do include the shared secret in their config. I presume they have a secure provisioning mechanism 16:47:36 I'm not very familiar with SSSD but I think that one as well can be configured to do PAM 2FA 16:47:50 jaimelm: ha 16:48:10 yes, it can 16:48:17 And yes, the use case is not great. Personally I'm moving my servers behind Wireguard instead to avoid SSH issues 16:48:32 There might be some lag between IRC & Matrix 16:48:51 but yeah, in general I'm in agreement with lucab's comment re. trying to de-emphasize SSH 16:49:05 Matrix -> IRC is instant but IRC -> Matrix is lagging 16:49:34 I should switch to Matrix 16:49:54 de-emphasize is fine, but I really don't think we're going to get rid of it as an escape hatch 16:50:14 If you use the same secret for your whole fleet then it's no longer really 2FA 16:50:15 and I commend the effort here by the requestor to try to enhance security 16:50:21 but this would work :) 16:50:39 travier: maybe i'm confused.. do you use a different SSH key for every machine you log in to? 16:50:51 dustymabe: mostly yes :) 16:51:10 ^^ 16:51:13 dustymabe: right, I don't think we should actively try to hinder it 16:51:38 i've got like 10+ machines here at home. def don't have a different key for each one 16:51:43 In this case, if you have 100 systems, as OTP is time based, if you have the password or the key, then you get 100*3 tries for the OTP code 16:51:51 if you have only a single shared secret 16:52:10 I don't think we should try to influence how people consume FCOS too heavily. I feel SSH is fine and I use it a lot across my fleet of FCOS servers. 16:52:23 I keep the key separated by usage & platform/providers 16:52:32 OVH has a different one than DO, etc. 16:52:35 yeah I have a different key per provided 16:52:37 provider 16:52:49 for sure it's staying around, but the less it gets abused to transport other production services, the better 16:53:06 I'm not against adding it but the experience won't really be better then overlaying on first boot 16:53:49 anywho - i guess what I'm trying to say is I'm personally a little more on the fence. Though I guess travier has a good point about reduced security with reusing the OTP secret 16:54:27 dustymabe: the SSH key is asymmetric (pub+priv). The TOTP seed is a shared secret. 16:54:47 I feel ssh is fine too and I use it. I don't think we should say either how folks should use FCOS 16:54:55 I use it too* 16:55:36 Would adding it improve the experience? Not by that much 16:56:04 well, if we added it and also provided good documentation for how to use it, might be nice 16:56:13 but yeah, the docs could just add the layer as well 16:56:28 SSH is necessary for Ansible if there is config which can't be provided by ignition or unit files (that that it relates to the 2FA aspect of this discussion) 16:56:31 I want to get smallstep.com working on FCOS in the next few months. I think that is going to require some layering however and I accept that on my end. I hope maybe the container layering that is in the works for rpm-ostree makes this a better end user exp. 16:56:33 my bottom line is: this is not a common setup nor one we want to recommend users to do. RPM overlaying covers exactly that for people who need to. 16:56:40 We don't even have an example proving that it will work with a Butane config (I don't know the module storage format) 16:56:43 also might be nice to investigate what lucab suggested to see if SSSD can handle this use case 16:57:06 dustymabe: it can 16:57:33 oh nice 16:57:45 maybe one of the 8 sssd packages we include could handle this use case then? 16:57:55 Maybe update the ticket that this is still under discussion and research is being done. 16:58:10 there is also an implicit time dependency there. So if NTP on the node is screwed then you also can't access SSH anymore. 16:58:12 would be nice if we had a volunteer for that "research" part 16:58:23 * jaimelm looks around 16:58:40 👀 16:58:44 jaimelm: are you sure this is handled by SSSD? 16:58:57 Pretty sure, but I can verify. 16:59:02 if there was a doc page for SSSD we could point the original requestor to they might be able to do the research 16:59:11 which goes back to: let's not mess with SSH, it's an admin/recovery tool, not a general transport for other services 16:59:29 IDK lucab I order lunch over SSH... 16:59:40 I'm talking to you right now over SSH :) 16:59:49 same here 16:59:55 :) 16:59:56 SSH forever 17:00:16 it's hard to get away from it for a single node use case 17:00:20 :D do you mean ssh is the future ? 17:00:28 indeed 17:00:31 and the past 17:00:32 if you've got a platform like OKD, it's easier to let it fade away 17:01:05 right, but if you're using nodes without that layer of control, it's necessary (again, Ansible) 17:01:24 I do not disagree, but by that line it's also easier to mess and install with a bazillion of random RPMs compared to containers 17:01:44 While I agree that we should not *emphasize* SSH usage, to me this is more about what adding this will get us 17:01:59 for example, fifofonix uses many nodes without kubernetes. 17:02:04 Right now we are not sure this will significantly improve things, so we need the research first 17:02:15 yep 17:03:01 #proposed It was suggested that SSSD, which we already ship, can handle 2FA in a similar. We'd like to investigate more to see if the SSSD stack we already ship is a possible solution. 17:03:17 similar fashion. 17:04:00 does that reflect the sentiment in the room? 17:04:05 +1 17:04:08 We use SSSD with Duo on RHEL. So... should be cool. 17:04:11 but even if it turns out it isn't, my answer would still be "overlay and customize as you wish" 17:04:23 would prefer we mention overlaying 17:04:42 travier: I thought the jury was out on that 17:04:55 do we want to do a hypothetical scenario? 17:05:09 I think the bigger question is how do we make layering easier and better so users default to that route. That is a topic for a later time I think tho. 17:05:14 Even if SSSD can't handle 2FA/OTP.... 17:05:28 +1 jdoss 17:05:33 jdoss: there's open tickets for that 17:05:40 Oh I know :) 17:05:44 #proposed: We will not add google-authenticator-libpam for now. Overlaying the package on first-boot is the currently recommended approach. It should be investigated if SSSD would be able to perform 2FA. 17:05:47 It's a tough one. 17:06:25 votes? 17:06:29 ack 17:06:33 +1 17:06:41 i'm -0+ 17:06:42 +1 17:07:12 I give my vote to someone who lnow what exactly is sssd :D 17:07:18 lol 17:07:27 more votes? jlebon lucab others? 17:07:39 +0.75 17:07:42 -1 on this 17:07:56 +1 from my side 17:08:02 lorbus: what are your thoughts? 17:08:13 lorbus: what are you thinking? 17:08:52 if the SSSD line fails and a lot of people want this, it could make sense to just bake it in 17:09:00 also, I'd really like to see an actual Butane configuration of this working on N>1 nodes, either via SSSD or this PAM plugin, before discussing package inclusion 17:09:25 if SSSD works with 2FA, I'm +1 :) 17:09:52 +1 for lucab's suggestion. I think this should work as layering so we need examples that adding this to the image would significantly improve things 17:10:05 #agreed We will not add google-authenticator-libpam for now. Overlaying the package on first-boot is the currently recommended approach. It should be investigated if SSSD would be able to perform 2FA. 17:10:12 ok I'll try to write this up in the ticket 17:10:31 also, this isn't the first time we get "I'd like to get package X in FCOS" and it's unclear whether they actual tried to use the proposed software first 17:10:41 #topic Make it easier to change crypto policy 17:10:47 #link https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/607 17:10:55 this will be a fun one. 17:10:58 jlebon: you opened this a while ago.. 17:11:19 BTC miners by default in FCOS??? 17:11:21 I'm starting to try to go through old tickets and push forward discussion/action or close out as irrelevant. 17:11:26 I'll see myself out 17:11:35 🚪 17:11:52 jdoss: :) 17:11:55 dustymabe: blast from the past :) 17:11:57 I'd like to have the 2FA feature. the pam module is small so I feel it's OK to include. If it works without that natively with SSSD, even better. 17:12:26 lorbus: you can help answer our open questions in the ticket then.. more discussion will be had there for sure 17:12:27 lorbus: note that Matrix is lagging behind today 17:12:40 lorbus: thanks 17:13:18 For this one, Butane sugar might not be that appropriate as it would change meaning depending on the config actually available on the system 17:13:26 jlebon: so the current suggestion was to add Butane sugar to set the policy rather than someone running `update-crypto-policies` 17:13:29 travier: correct 17:13:43 https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/security_hardening/using-the-system-wide-cryptographic-policies_security-hardening 17:14:36 mmmmm FIPS 17:14:41 But it would only set the symlinks to a named version so this would still be the same independent of any version 17:14:49 FIPS is not supported on FCOS 17:14:56 I know. Believe me I know. 17:15:14 It's why I can't use it in some of my work environments. 17:15:14 the alternative was to try to get someone to rewrite `update-crypto-policies` 17:15:43 jlebon: what's the suggested path forward now 17:16:12 travier: hmm, if e.g. FUTURE changes meaning, that's common to all systems that ship crypto-policies, no? 17:16:22 do we need to insulate FCOS users specifically from that? 17:16:22 This is the same thing as the alternatives issue. We should write a short workaround Butane config with the symlinks while we wait for a rewrite of the tool 17:16:57 jlebon: no, you're right. 17:17:01 but yeah, the annoying thing is that there's no butane-time way to know what is a valid policy 17:17:08 yes 17:17:37 mostly agreed re. just documenting Butane snippets for now 17:17:41 Just like alternatives, we need a Rust/Go rewrite of this small tool. 17:17:42 could we use toolbox for this? 17:18:05 dustymabe: how would that help? 17:18:06 dustymabe: this was discussed in the thread IIRC 17:18:35 run `update-crypto-policies` from inside a toolbox container (target the host) 17:18:37 wow Matrix is way behind on my end today, it's arriving here all out of order. My vote doesn't make a lot of sense now. +1 on supporting 2FA in SSSD :) 17:18:43 it works, but the problem is version skew 17:18:53 https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/strong-crypto-settings-how-best-to-define-apply/22600/16?u=siosm 17:19:12 travier: sorry - oh man - there was a lot of context there 17:19:24 lorbus: I dropped from Matrix and re-joined from IRC 17:19:42 IRC and SSH, the past and the future. 17:20:18 jlebon: "version skew" - I need to understand that more 17:20:29 No ssh here, just an alpine on WSL windows machine 17:20:36 what if you had the same version packages in the container as on the host? 17:20:46 dustymabe: if you define custom policies, they will drift WRT the default ones 17:20:51 then it'd work, yeah 17:21:04 but that happens no matter what 17:21:06 but the UX is super dubious and I wouldn't want to document it 17:21:13 we have the updates-archive repo now, we could make sure we get the same packages in the container 17:21:28 jlebon: agree, it's a bit awkward 17:21:41 just trying to get something out of these lemons 17:21:53 plus, you usually want it right from the start, not after e.g. pulling containers 17:22:04 dustymabe: hehe 17:22:31 it would be really nice if we didn't have to run a dynamic tool `update-crypto-policies` 17:22:39 ^^ 17:23:22 anyone want to put forth a #proposed on this one? 17:24:20 #proposed we will recommend using Butane to set symlinks for now and approach upstream on whether there are any plans to rewrite the tool 17:24:30 are folks generally in agreement on documenting a Butane solution first? 17:24:44 there we go 17:24:45 ack 17:24:48 seems reasonable as it's the quickest path to getting something 17:25:05 ack / +1 17:25:29 This could be an outreachy project 17:25:31 there's a strongly related item here, which is that FCOS isn't fully wired for FIPS mode 17:25:32 https://gitlab.com/redhat-crypto/fedora-crypto-policies 17:25:46 jlebon++ 17:25:46 jaimelm: Karma for jlebon changed to 2 (for the current release cycle): https://badges.fedoraproject.org/tags/cookie/any 17:26:29 at least update-crypto-policies is less than 500 lines of code 17:26:37 any other votes on the current proposed? 17:26:38 in the case where what the users actually want is FIPS, we should have better sugar for that 17:26:56 Indeed 17:27:08 +1 for proposed 17:27:34 ok we have 3 +1 17:27:41 #agreed we will recommend using Butane to set symlinks for now and approach upstream on whether there are any plans to rewrite the tool 17:28:18 #topic open floor 17:28:27 we're close to time so I'll skip other topics 17:28:33 anybody have anything for open floor today? 17:28:59 Should we cancel the meetings during the holidays? 17:29:04 #info we'll probably skip the community meeting on 12/22 and 12/29 for the holidays. 17:29:04 yes, we have kubernetes tests running in the pipeline now! 17:29:05 (I won't be there) 17:29:07 https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-pipeline/blob/main/jobs/kola-kubernetes.Jenkinsfile 17:29:13 travier: :) 17:29:16 :) 17:29:17 Is there someine working on user level units ? 17:29:21 jlebon: nice! is it passing yet? 17:29:25 jlebon: cool 17:29:26 dustymabe: we'll find out soon :) 17:29:34 jlebon: nice! 17:29:36 nemric: you mean Ignition support for user systemd units? 17:29:45 jlebon++ 17:29:52 jlebon++ 17:30:04 @dustymabe yes 17:30:15 I don't know, which means probably not 17:30:21 would you want to work on it with some guidance? 17:30:24 :D 17:30:51 oh ! not sur being able to do that 17:31:02 #info I just learned you can actually make API calls and get an s390x cloud instance (with /dev/kvm) in IBM Cloud 17:31:15 woah 17:31:30 nemric: it's OK, just let me know if you want to and we can try to find people to help 17:31:55 https://cloud.ibm.com/docs/vpc?topic=vpc-profiles&interface=ui#balanced-s390x-profiles 17:32:02 only in the Tokyo region ^^ 17:32:27 any other topics for open floor? 17:32:33 ok, just let me know later how to contribute in a staightforward way and only a poor windows laptop ^^ 17:32:57 I'd like to try 17:33:19 +1 17:33:23 * dustymabe closes meeting soon 17:33:30 dustymabe: does the last part of your sentence mean that they have nested virtualization? 17:34:06 lucab: I assume so. The device exists in this instance I'm playing with but haven't tried anything 17:34:21 so it might exist and not work 17:34:23 dustymabe: loop me in on that. Having written that unit documentation a while back, it's still in my head. 17:34:43 jaimelm: i.e. you want to help add the feature to Ignition? 17:34:49 yessir 17:34:54 wow, that's awesome 17:35:04 will chat with you all more over in #fedora-coreos 17:35:06 #endmeeting